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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)G). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in using a Recital, which the Hinckley Town failed to 
properly post or codify, to interpret the ordinances of the town and to affirm the decision 
of the Hinckley Town Appeal Authority, thereby finding that Mr. Cahoon's fence is in 
violation of Hinckley Town's ordinances? 
a. Standard of Review: An appellate court reviews a district court's 
determination of a land use decision made by a municipal appeal authority under an 
arbitrary, capricious and illegal standard. Mr. Cahoon has brought forth his 
arguments on the basis of illegality. "Because a determination of illegality is based 
on the land use authority's interpretation of zoning ordinances, we review such 
determinations for correctness, but we also afford some level of non-binding 
deference to the interpretation advanced by the land use authority." Fox v. Park City, 
2008 UT 85, If 11, 200 P.3d 182; See also, Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, \ 
28, 104 P.3d 1208. 
b. Preservation: This issue was raised and preserved before the Hinckley 
Town Appeal Authority at the hearing, and in Mr. Cahoon's opening Memorandum 
and his Reply Memorandum in support of his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
(See, Appeal Authority Hearing Transcript (hereinafter "AA Hearing"), Record 
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(hereinafter "R.") p. 216-220; Memorandum and Reply Memorandum, R. 268-298, 
326-338).1 
2. Did the trial court err in failing to strictly construe Hinckley Town's zoning 
ordinances in favor of Mr. Cahoon? 
a. Standard of Review: An appellate court reviews a district court's 
determination of a land use decision made by a municipal appeal authority under an 
arbitrary, capricious and illegal standard. Mr. Cahoon has brought forth his 
arguments on the basis of illegality. ''Because a determination of illegality is based 
on the land use authority's interpretation of zoning ordinances, we review such 
determinations for correctness, but we also afford some level of non-binding 
deference to the interpretation advanced by the land use authority." Fox, 2008 UT 85, 
1f 11; See also, Carrier, 2004 UT 98, ^ j 28. 
b. Preservation: This issue was raised and preserved in Mr. Cahoon's opening 
Memorandum and his Reply Memorandum in support of his Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. (See, AA Hearing, R. 216-220; Memorandum and Reply 
Memorandum, R. 268-298, 326-338). 
1
 The pagination of the Record in this matter is somewhat confused. Normally, the 
Record is stamped sequentially in reverse order. UTAH R. APP. P., Rule 11(b)(2)(A). 
However, it appears in this matter that the trial court stamped each document with a 
beginning number, and then stamped each page in each document in descending order. 
Hence, the pages in the record begin at page 13 proceeding through to page 1, then to 
page 14, then to page 17 through 15, and so on. At one point the pagination jumps from 
page 33 to page 259. In order to reduce confusion, this brief will refer to the title of the 
document being referenced, along with the Record page number. 
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3. Did the trial court err in failing to follow the vested rights doctrine and 
grant Mr. Cahoon's fence building permit when such permit complied with all of 
Hinckley Town's zoning ordinances at the time of his application? 
a. Standard of Review: An appellate court reviews a district court's 
determination of a land use decision made by a municipal appeal authority under an 
arbitrary, capricious and illegal standard. Mr. Cahoon has brought forth his 
arguments on the basis of illegality. "Because a determination of illegality is based 
on the land use authority's interpretation of zoning ordinances, we review such 
determinations for correctness, but we also afford some level of non-binding 
deference to the interpretation advanced by the land use authority." Fox, 2008 UT 85, 
\U\See also, Carrier, 2004 UT 98, If 28. 
b. Preservation: This issue was preserved at the Hinckley Town Appeal 
Authority hearing and in the trial court at oral arguments for Mr. Cahoon's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. (See Appeal Authority Hearing Documentation, R. 98-
106; Trial Court Oral Arguments, R. 381, Transcript p. 30, lines 13-20.) 
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-3-711(1), -713, -715. 
Hinckley Town Code 10-4-8(A) and 10-4-13(G). 
- 3 -
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 2006, Appellant Alonzo Cahoon built a home on a lot he owned in Hinckley 
Town, Millard County, Utah. (Building Permit, R. 45-6.) In early 2008 Mr. Cahoon 
contacted Hinckley Town in regards to the construction of a fence around his home. 
(Town Council Minutes, R. 47-56) Mr. Cahoon had various discussions and meetings 
with the Hinckley Town Council and its Mayor in which Mr. Cahoon was given mixed 
messages regarding whether he could move forward in building his fence. (Town 
Council Minutes, R. 47-56; Town Council Transcript, R. 57-86; AA Hearing, R. 153-54, 
234.) Ultimately, Mr. Cahoon built the fence in compliance with Hinckley Town's 
published zoning ordinances. Specifically, Hinckley Town ordinances provide that any 
solid fence built within the 30 foot front yard setback requirement cannot exceed 36 
inches. (Addendum: Hinckley Town Code 10-4-13G; R. 138.) Due to the building 
permit granted to Mr. Cahoon for the construction of his home, it was unclear which 
portion of Mr. Cahoon's lot would be considered the front yard. (R. 45-6.) Although, 
Mr. Cahoon built portions of his molded concrete fence to exceed 36 inches in height he 
ensured that the fence was set back more than 30 feet from his lot or parcel line. (AA 
Hearing, R. 154, 162.) 
After Mr. Cahoon constructed his fence, Hinckley Town asserted that the fence 
was in violation of Town ordinances and attempted to charge Mr. Cahoon criminally. 
(AA Hearing, R. 232.) However, Hinckely Town had never issued a written denial of his 
fence permit. Therefore, Hinckley Town was forced to drop the criminal charges and 
_ A _ 
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issued a written denial, which Mr. Cahoon appealed pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-
9a-704. On March 4, 2009 the Hinckley Town Appeal Authority convened a hearing to 
address Mr. Cahoon's appeal. (AA Hearing, R. 142.) 
As is common in many rural communities, the street which fronts Mr. Cahoon's 
home is not dedicated to the city, but rather Mr. Cahoon's title line extends to the middle 
of the road. (AA Hearing, R. 154, 162, 189-192.) The Town therefore only has a right-
of-way along the road fronting Mr. Cahoon's property and his lot or title line extends half 
way through the road. Id. At the hearing Mr. Cahoon presented undisputed evidence that 
the fence is set back 35 feet 8 inches from his property line, well within the 30 foot set 
back requirement. Id. Based on the undisputed evidence of the distance between the 
fence and the title line, Mr. Cahoon argued that, regardless of which part of his lot is his 
side yard or front yard, the fence complies with Hinckley Town's zoning requirements 
because it is set back more than 30 feet from his lot or parcel line. Id. 
In response to Mr. Cahoon's argument, Hinckley Town produced at the hearing a 
previously unknown and undisclosed Ordinance Amendment and Recital, dated June 2, 
2005 (hereinafter "Recital"), which states that in the areas of Hinckley Town where the 
roads are not Town property and where lot lines extend to the center of the road with 
public rights of way, the set back is measured from the edge of the road. (Recital, R. 40; 
AA Hearing, R. 185-188.) Mr. Cahoon objected to this Recital as not having been 
properly posted, certified and incorporated in the Hinckley Town Code in compliance 
with Utah statutes and as not having been provided to him when he requested copies of 
all zoning ordinances. (AA Hearing, R. 216-219.) Previously, Mr. Cahoon had 
- 5 -
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requested copies of all applicable zoning ordinances and regulation, including the entire 
municipal code of Hinckley Town. (AA Hearing, R. 218; Memorandum, R. 272.) Mr. 
Cahoon was given copies of what was represented to be the complete Town Code, which 
did not include this Recital. Id. 
Mr. Cahoon also made arguments and presented evidence regarding his building 
permit yard designations and the orientation of his home toward an un-built but platted 
road, his conversation with council members and the mayor indicating he could build the 
fence, and the fact that Hinckley Town had permitted other fences to be built without 
complying with the Recital. (AA Hearing, R. 151-170; Memorandum, R. 272-287.) 
Sometime after the March 4, 2009 hearing the Hinckley Town Appeal Authority 
issued a decision directly relying on the Recital and denying Mr. Cahoon's appeal. 
(Appeal Authority Decision, R. 38-40.) 
In response, Mr. Cahoon filed a Petition for Review and Complaint appealing the 
decision of the Hinckley Town Appeal Authority. (Petition and Complaint, R. 1-13.) 
During briefing and oral arguments Mr. Cahoon presented authority that the Recital was 
not the law and could not properly form the basis for the Appeal Authority's decision, 
because it had not been properly posted, certified or codified, and argued that the vested 
rights doctrine and the rules for ordinance interpretation required that the Appeal 
Authority's decision be overturned. (Memorandum, R. 272-283; Reply Memorandum, R. 
331-36; Oral Arguments Transcript, R. 381.) On March 8, 2010, the trial court issued a 
Ruling upholding the decision of the Hinckley Town Appeal Authority and finding that 
the Recital, although not the law, could be used to enforce Hinckley Town's ordinances 
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against Mr. Cahoon. (Ruling, R. 342-352.) On December 8, 2010 the trial court issued 
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Affirming the Decision of the Hinckley Town Appeal 
Authority. (Findings, Conclusions and Order, R. 363-371.) Mr. Cahoon filed a Notice of 
Appeal on January 3, 2011. (Notice of Appeal, R. 372-373.) j 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS I 
The primary issue in this case is whether or not Mr. Cahoon built a fence which 
complies with Hinckley Town's zoning ordinances. Mr. Cahoon's fence facially 
complies with the requirements of Hinckley Town's published ordinances, because his 
fence is set back more than 35 feet from his lot line, but Hinckley Town has sought to 
enforce against Mr. Cahoon a Recital which would alter the measuring line for Mr. 
Cahoon's property. This Recital has never been posted, certified or incorporated into 
Hinckley Town's code and, therefore, has not taken the effect of law and cannot be 
enforced against Mr. Cahoon. Moreover, according to long standing rules of statutory 
construction for zoning ordinances, Utah law requires that zoning ordinances be strictly 
construed in favor of the private property owner's proposed use. Thus even if Hinckley 
Town's ordinances are ambiguous in regards to the line for measuring set back 
requirements, such ambiguity must be resolved in favor of Mr. Cahoon's proposed use. 
It was improper of the trial court to use the Recital as a measuring stick for reasonable 
land use restrictions, thereby enforcing the Recital against Mr. Cahoon in spite of the fact 
that it is not enforceable law. This Court should reverse the decision of the Hinckley 
Town Appeal Authority and reverse the decision of the trial court. Mr. Cahoon's fence 
- 7 -
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complies with Hinckley Town's published ordinances and he is entitled to a grant of his 
fence permit. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH LAW REQUIRES THAT ZONING ORDINANCES BE 
CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE PROPERTY OWNER, AND 
MR. CAHOON'S FENCE FACIALLY COMPLIES WITH HINCKLEY 
TOWN'S PUBLISHED SET BACK AND FENCING ORDINANCES. 
It is black letter law in Utah that zoning ordinances must be strictly construed in 
favor of the private property owner. "Since zoning ordinances are in derogation of a 
property owners use of land, we are also cognizant that any ordinance prohibiting a 
proposed use should be strictly construed in favor of allowing the use." Carrier v. Salt 
Lake County, 2004 UT 98, \ 31, 104 P.3d 1208; see also, Rogers v. West Valley City, 
2006 UT App 302, \ 15, 142 P.3d 554; Brown v. Sandy City Bd of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 
207, 210 (Utah App. 1998); Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 
606 (Utah App. 1995). 
The policy reason for this rule is that, under the common law, private property 
owners have the right to unrestricted use of their property. In light of these fundamental 
rights, zoning ordinances must be narrowly tailored to a legitimate health, safety or 
welfare concern and must be strictly construed in favor of the common law property 
rights they restrict. "Because zoning ordinances are in derogation of a property owner's 
common-law right to unrestricted use of his or her property, provisions therein restricting 
property uses should be strictly construed, and provisions permitting property uses should 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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be liberally construed in favor of the property owner." Rogers, 2006 UT App 302, \ 15; 
see also, Brown, 957 P.2d at 210; Patterson, 893 P.2d at 606. 
In Brown v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, this Court determined that the purposes 
and broad goals of a particular ordinance were insufficient to prohibit a particular use that 
was not expressly prohibited, even when such a use was inconsistent with the codified 
purposes and broad goals of the ordinance. "[W]e will not find a violation of law simply 
because the permitted use may appear inconsistent with the general intent statement when 
the use is in compliance with the substantive provisions of the ordinance." Brown, 957 
P.2d at 212. Thus, when "the use of the property] has met the legal requirements of [the 
ordinance]" the proposed use must be permitted. Id. 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Mr. Cahoon is entitled to rely upon Hinckely 
Town's published ordinances at the time that he first made his application for a fence 
permit. This principle, called the vested rights doctrine, was first articulated by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Western Land Equities v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). 
The vested rights doctrine has now been codified by the Utah Legislature: "[A]n 
applicant is entitled to approval of a land use application if the application conforms to 
the requirements of the municipality's land use maps, zoning map, and applicable land 
use ordinance in effect when a complete application is submitted and all application fees 
have been paid." UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-509(l)(a). Based on this doctrine, Mr. 
Cahoon was entitled to a grant of his fence building permit at the time he made 
application for it, if his application complied with the ordinance "in effect" at the time of 
his application. 
- 9 -
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In the present case, Mr. Cahoon's fence complies with Hinckley Town's published 
ordinances. The Hinckley Town code requires that a solid fence which is placed within 
the front yard set back of the lot cannot exceed a height of 36 inches. (Addendum: 
Hinckley Town Code 10-4-13(G); R. 138.) Although the ordinance repeatedly mentions 
the thirty foot front yard set back, the ordinance only articulates once the manner in 
which the line for measuring the front yard set back is determined. "Front yard. Each lot 
or parcel in the R Zone shall have a front yard of not less than thirty (30) feet." 
(Addendum: Hinckley Town Code 10-4-8(A); R. 135.) The ordinance directly references 
the "lot" as the reference point for determining set back measurements. 'Lot' is defined 
as, "A tract of land, esp. one having specific boundaries." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 
966 (8th ed. 2004). By referencing the lot, and thereby the boundaries of a particular 
portion of property, the ordinance implies that the set back is measured on the basis of the 
lot or title line. Mr. Cahoon's lot, as well as those of his neighbors, goes to the center of 
the road fronting their property. (AA Hearing, R. 154, 162, 189-192.) Thus, per 
Hinckley Town's own ordinances, Mr. Cahoon is required to build his fence (which is 
solid and does exceed 36 inches in height) at least 30 feet back from the edge of his 
property, from his lot line. (Addendum: Hinckley Town Code 10-4-8(A) and 10-4-
13(G); R. 138, 135.) It is undisputed by the parties that Mr. Cahoon's fence is set back 
35 feet, 8 inches from the edge of his property. (AA Hearing, R. 154, 162.) Because the 
fence is set back more than thirty feet from his lot or title line, his fence complies with 
Hinckley Town's zoning ordinances. 
1 A 
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Recital, the Hinckley Town Appeal Authority determined that Mr. Cahoon's fence was in 
violation of Hinckley Town's zoning ordinances. (Appeal Authority Decision, R. 38-40.) 
This decision violated not only of Mr. Cahoon's right to have the zoning 
ordinances construed in his favor, but the decision also violated Mr. Cahoon's right as a 
citizen to notice of the laws and ordinances that apply to him. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
RECITAL INTRODUCED BY HINCKLEY TOWN IS NOT LAW, BUT 
ERRONEOUSLY ENFORCED THE RECITAL AGAINST MR. CAHOON 
ANYWAY. 
The constitutional protection of due process of law requires, among many other 
things, that citizens have adequate notice of the laws that govern them. In a municipal 
setting, it is well established that due process requires that municipal bodies maintain a 
compilation of the laws in effect that the public has access to. Salina City v. Lewis, 172 
P. 286, 289 (Utah 1918). This can take the form of a physical book or looseleaf, or 
ordinances can be made available online. Moreover, when changes to this body of law 
are made, due process requires that adequate notice be given that changes are 
contemplated, and that once changes are made, the public be notified so that objections 
can be made or referenda sought. Low v. City ofMonticello, 2004 UT 90, f^ 13, 103 P.3d 
130. In contemplation of these due process requirements Utah has enacted several 
publication statutes which clearly outline the proper procedure for publication and notice 
necessary before any passed ordinance can take effect. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-3-
711(1). Before an ordinance, which has been passed by appropriate legislative action, 
may take effect, either a short summary must be published in a local newspaper or it must 
_ 1? . 
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("I r I ' s> 1 1 C O D E A 1 IT I § 10 3 7 1.5) ' I I lese at e sii i ij: n< n :i ji menu an s t nal sal lsly i L; ini) ' i >v < 
t h r e s h o l d o i ih„Li^- a n d d u e p u n e s s L o w . 2 0 0 4 I I {)i- • ; • 
i„ 4-Uw, p o r i N u j t M c a s e , l l . n c k k ' v i«uMi : a i i o . :• at ->K i n e > c ba.ML l e q i u r e m e n t s 
/vL. Walloon aigued that his ience VVJO in compliance v»i», Hinckley Town's existing 
ordinances , ar 'herefore. Ilia' theie w;r- m> basK for Hincklex Town In di, a . hi- fenee 
pei ian appn * . < .. • * ;^" i n 
produced, for the first time, a copy of the Recital. (AA 1 tearing, R. 185-188.) Hinckley 
Towi f s 'fa.ilu.re to produce the Reciial w.r.U that time is significant because., if valid, the 
Keea t . , . \ollkl e i ; e^ l l \ appi • * ai.ooti - leiHV * J . t -i i s p e d 1 K . . . . * p u - des 
that, in poi tioi is of I Iinckle> I bw n & 1 lei e tl: ic i oads at e i lot dedicated ai id tl le I o\v i I c i i.lh» 
has a right-of-way along the road.. Hie NCI hack is nieasuied from the edge of die road and 
not boh-- ,JK :-{<- i •• • •• » *i!ii-^ ri s lenee ks >ei hack 3^ feet S au :u-- I IOT his 
I' 3t l.i.i i.(: ,. bi it DI lb f a b c i it 2.5 fe et bac 1 :. li < :)i i i tl. le edge of tl le i 3a.( 1 ( \ : • 1 1'eai ii ig, R 1.5 Ik, 
162.) 
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Being a very small town (population of less than 1,000), Hinckley does not keep 
its ordinances online and they can only be accessed by the public through a visit to the 
Town Recorder's Office. Mr. Cahoon and his wife made two such visits for the specific 
purpose of obtaining all applicable ordinances. (R. 218, 272.) On the first visit, Mrs. 
Cahoon requested a complete copy of Hinckley Town's zoning and land use ordinances. 
At that time she was furnished with a copy of Title 10 of the Town Code. No copy of the 
Recital was provided to her. On the second visit, Mr. Cahoon requested a copy of the 
entirety of Hinckley Town's Code. An entire copy of the code was provided to Mr. 
Cahoon. Again, no copy of the Recital was ever produced or included. 
Mr. Cahoon challenged the validity of the Recital on the basis that he had never 
been provided a copy when he asked for all of Hinckley Town's ordinances, and that it 
appeared that the Recital had not been posted, published, or codified, as there was no 
attached certification and it was clearly not part of the codified ordinances. In response, a 
member of the Town Council admitted that they had tried "to find out where it was 
encoded, and apparently we did not get that accomplished." (AA Hearing, R. 185.) At 
another point, this same council member stated that the Recital "was supposed to be 
incorporated in title form and it did not get added, physically added I mean." (AA 
Hearing, R. 193.) Finally, near the end of the hearing, another council member stated 
that the Recital "was to be put in to the newly accepted ordinance, it was missed, it 
wasn't put in. That was probably part of my responsibility to get that put in to the 
ordinance, it was not." (AA Hearing, R. 253.) 
- 14 -
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I • •'- . i * ' " e . < 
relied upon the Recital as its p n m a i ) reason tor upholding the denial ot \ < </ahoou"s 
fence permit application and goes so far as to Attach ilu- Renta l as the M>le exhibit to tl leir 
vv i ittv : i i decisioi ( ' appeal \ i itl: 1.01: it) Decisioi 1. R 38 40 ) ' 1 1 i = i \ i ised tl: lis an :i: lei ldi it lei it 
to Gcteiiuiiic that set back measurement s are made from where the public rk ' lu oi wa> 
ends , " Id. The Appeal Author i ty goes oi I to state: "It is our finding thai >.:. Gaboon ' s 
f e i u < . d o e s i . e i :.,| ; <, .. .._ • : . . . . . . . i , • 
s i \ v ; ^ "• iL within ; =-. -*••; y.\ h hi. 
Because the Recital was n e \ e r posted, certified. • incorporated into 'he code Mi 
Cahoon never <^;a-nc(; a corv ; was never ;-,.ui
 (1. -u ;. iimi was never o t i K i u i s e 
:t :i: iade aware ::::)' ' •  *** * '- ->• 
officials at the Appea l Author i ty hear ing, the trial coui t proper ly found that "[t]he Recital 
was not proper ly posted, certified, or incorporated into the municipal c o d e " (Ruling, R 
345) ai id tl: t * * -. -. -
 n^ fj iet e f 0 i e, i ic: t be 
enforceable as iavv. ^Ruling, R. 348.) However , in ^pitc oi*these findings, the trial court 
went m !o enforce (lie Reciial against Mr . Cahoon anyway, The trial court reached this 
result because it: coi ich ided tl: lat tl le R ecital 1| vas a it easoi iable v ii itei pi: etatioi :t ::  f tl le 
publ ished ordinances , and that the s tandard of review in this mat ter was whether the 
Iliiu kley T o w n Appeal Author i ty ' s interpretation of its ordii lances was " reasonable" . 
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III. CORRECTNESS IS THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND UTAH LAW BARS ENFORCEMENT OF THE RECITAL IN ANY 
FASHION. 
The trial courts adoption of the standard of review as one of reasonableness, rather 
than correctness and legality, was error. The standard of review for a land use decision 
depends upon the basis of the dispute. If the dispute is legal in nature, then both the trial 
court and the appellate court review the determination for 'correctness'. If the dispute is 
factual and evidentiary in nature, then a land use decision is upheld as long as there is 
'substantial evidence' in the record to support it. 
This standard of review on a petition for review from the decision of a municipal 
land use appeal authority is clearly outlined in UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-801(3)(c), "A 
final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the decision is 
supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal." Several cases have specifically interpreted the meaning of this statute: 
"Like the review of the district court, our review is limited to 
whether a land use authority's decision is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal. A land use authority's decision is 
arbitrary or capricious only if it is not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record. A land use authority's 
decision is illegal if it violates a law, statute, or ordinance in 
effect at the time the decision was made. Because a 
determination of illegality is based on the land use authority's 
interpretation of zoning ordinances, we review such 
determinations for correctness, but we also afford some level 
of non-binding deference to the interpretation advanced by 
the land use authority." 
Fox v. Park City, 2008 UT 85, lj 11, 200 P.3d 182 (emphasis added); See also, Carrier, 
2004 UT 98, Tl 28. "If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the record 
- 1 6 -
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prov ided lb;;; > tl le lai id i lse ai itl: 101 it;;; r 01 appeal ai dl ic i it;> , as tl le case i i ia;;y be ",*1 I I I ' Vl--! ( "ODE 
A N N . § 10-9a-801(8)(a)(i) . 
The pr imary dispute between the p a i t u - ^ -Aliul.ei ^ i . I U H M S fence properly 
coil iplies "vv itl 1l l ,i , t111 iil":"sl ie d 01 dii lai i ::es of I Hi lckle ;; f I • : v n i 1 1 lis :> JI istiti it : s a 
determination oi illenalitv. which is reviewed for correctness, with a small level of non-
hindtng deference, and is only dependent "i- ilie reei*'*- nn^m--h a- if i- necessary to 
estau;iM. .it. underlying undisputed iuu .vi.;re^mg \\\\< fmestn... •. 
deten nined tl lat 'I\ Ii Cal 1001 fs fei ice w as ii i \ iolatiot 1 of I linckley I owrrs ordinances— 
not because his tenec \ lolau - IIK actual language oi -\K .>:dirunces--but txvau^. -lu. 
Recital was an unpuhn>iiui r» ,K > »ii vnlorcement win .u .,1. i.iri ;ound seasonable. 
In read: lii ig ; . - • • • - . . • -
 ZQI iii ig 
ordinance interpretation: that zoning ordinances must be construed in favor of the pri\ ate 
property owner. Carrier, 2004 UT 98. * M: see also, Rogers, 2006 I IT App 302, j[ 15; 
Bf i ni w,957I *.2< lie Lt 2 1 0 : / *attt ? s i rr - • . -,.. -, , ... .. * . • 
As has been shown previously, \ i i . Cahooii is entitled to have Hinckley T o w n ' s 
published o r d n a n c e s liberally coi isti ued ii i. 1 lis f a \ n and strictly construed aL-ainsi 
Hii ickle> I o'vv i i Ii I .1 loldii ig tl lat tl le pi o\ isions and restrictioi is of tl ic Recital, altl 101 igh 
not enforceable law, were still "reasonable" and thereby enforcing UK pu>\ isnns .lL -^mst 
Mr. Cahoon, the trial court ^iV-^e n follow this rule ! his holding was legal error. 
By raying on the kvx lai n.L wu.« *ourt, ?* .: . * . , i iu:u I *v-\•; \npc:ii 
A i itl loi it;;y , n ia.de tl le ii i lplied fn idii ig tl: lat tl; te pi iblisl led 1 Hi ick .ley ' I a * ' i I ordii iai ices i > 'ere 
ambiguous in regards to where the measur ing line is loi die from \ a rd set back. Botli the 
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Hinckley Town Appeal Authority and the trial court then reached outside of the 
published ordinances to resolve this ambiguity and relied upon the Recital. (Ruling, R. 
348-350.) In other words, the trial court found that the Recital was a good source for 
determining the intent and purpose of the set back ordinances, and that if the proposed 
prohibition fit within the general purpose of the ordinance, then it could be properly 
prohibited. Such a decision is in direct violation of Utah law. The case of Brown v. 
Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment is directly on point. In that case the city admitted that the 
use they were attempting to prohibit through enforcement was not literally prohibited 
under their ordinances. However, the city argued that the proposed use was clearly 
contrary to the broad statement of intent included in the zoning ordinance at issue. This 
Court determined that a statement of intent was not adequate enough to qualify as a 
prohibition. "[W]e will not find a violation of law simply because the permitted use may 
appear inconsistent with the general intent statement when the use is in compliance with 
the substantive provisions of the ordinance." Brown, 957 P.2d at 212. 
The same principles apply to Mr. Cahoon's fence. The zoning ordinance 
indicates, or at least implies, that the fence set back is thirty feet from his lot line. Mr. 
Cahoon's fence can only be prohibited if the ordinance is clear on its face that Mr. 
Cahoon's fence somehow violates it. Statements of intent or general purpose are 
unavailing. A plain reading of the ordinance, construing all ambiguities in favor of Mr. 
Cahoon, leads to the conclusion that his fence is in compliance with Hinckley Town's 
ordinances. A Recital, which is not and cannot be enforceable law, cannot be found 
enforceable anyway through semantic machinations. 
- 18-
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Ii i additic n, the vestei. . .L..II . u-»c nnc UKIII: - - • \._ •._•.; 
* : ' v " . . i n . f ! H i i ( i ^ . " • • . : * : • ; • . i : . : i • . •• > : , - ' 1 " 
approxal «'i nis fence permit application per the facia! requirements of the ordinance. 
UTAJI CODE ANN. K !<•' wa-MNMV-^ 'i : , Rcuiai uinin-; IK u^cd as a means to deny ins 
applicatiot 1, because, b;y tl i.e cleat tei i t is : f "I I I ' s I I C O D E A Is I ] • I § 10 3 ' 711 st seq , 1:1 le 
Recital had not taken iweffect" because it had not been published, certified or incorporated 
in the town code. Any reliance upon or use of the Recital is erroi Mr. Cahoon is entitled 
t : • tl i : oi dii lai ice s ii i t: ffect at tl le tii i le of I lis application at id ai i) ai i ibigi iit> ii i tl le 
ordinance must be resolved in his favor. 
Because both the decision of tl le Hinckley Town Appeal Autho ni\ a no ilv 
decision ->t "'H !5',H -MUM ?»re review *;*; inr correctness, aiki oecause the\ .ncop"^t1w 
reverse the deer-.tMi ol tin. tnal OJLHI ard the Hinckle\ lown Appeal Authont) and i.uld 
that i' ; i ahooii > lence complies with I Imckio I own"** zoning ordinances. 
for the aforementioned reasons, this Court should hold that Mr. Gaboon's fence 
complies with Flinckley Town's ordinances and thereby reverse the decision of the 
I In id :\Q) I o^  * ' i 11 \ppeal < * i it! I :)i it} ' ai id tl le decisioi i. : f tl i. : ti ial :oi u: I: 
DATED and SIGNED tl us ^ ^ d a y of June, 2011. 
JEFFS R JFFFS PC. 
/ / / 
^kU^L ( (, 
Randall F I. 
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10-4-2 Permitted Uses 
10-4-3 Lot Area 
10-4-4 Lot Width 
10-4-5 Lot Frontage 
10-4-6 Prior Created Lots 
10-4-7 Lot Ares Per Dwellings 
10-4—8 Yard Requirements 
10-4-9 Projections Into Yards 
10-4-10 Building Heights 
10-4-11 Parking Loading And Access 
10-4-12 Site Plan Approval 
10-4—13 Other Requirements 
10-4-1 PURPOSE 
The Residential Zone (R) is established to provide areas for the encouragement and promotion of an 
environment for family life by providing for the establishment of one-family detached dwellings on 
individual lots. Multiple-family dwellings under certain restrictions. This zone is typically characterized by 
landscaped lots and open spaces with lawns, shrubs, small gardens and the keeping of farm animals, fowl 
and non-dangerous exotic animals. It is recognized that agriculture and the raising of poultry and livestock is 
desired by some property owners and is acceptable with appropriate safeguards for nearby residences. 
10-4-2 PERMITTED USES 
Those uses or categories of uses as listed herein, and no others, are permitted in the R zone. 
A. Permitted principal uses. The following principal uses and structures, and no others, are permitted in the 
Rzone. 
Accessory buildings and uses clearly incidental and commonly associated with the operation of the 
permitted use such as private garages, carports, greenhouses, swimming pools etc., but not including 
residential occupancy. 
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Churches and similar places of worship. 
Community Centers that are privately-owned and operated on a nonprofit basis. 
Domestic Livestock 
Double Wide Mobile Homes as limited herein. 
Esseintial public utility and public service installations. Such use shall not include business offices, repair, 
sales or storage facilities. 
Family foster homes which receive a maximum of four (4) children for regular full-time care. 
Fences, hedges and walls. 
Fire Station. 
Gardens, fruit trees, and field crops. 
Home occupations. 
Identification signs, provided such signs shall not exceed one (1) per lot, and shall not exceed three (3) 
square feet in area, and describe the lot upon which they are located. 
Libraries. 
Manufactured Homes 
Multiple-Family Dwelling, including condominiums and cooperatives. 
Nursing or convalescent homes. 
Parades. 
Personal & Family Agricultural uses only for dairying, poultry and livestock raising; provided, that 
buildings used for housing fowl or animals, storing grain or feed shall not be located closer than 
fifty (50) feet from any inhabitated family dwelling. 
Private Country Clubs, golf courses, swimming pools, park areas, private greenhouses and private nurseries. 
Privately-owned community centers operated on a nonprofit basis. 
Privately-operated day nurseries, pre-schools, and kindergartens; provided, that any play area is enclosed on 
all four (4) sides to a height of six (6) feet 
Public Parks, playgrounds, community buildings and similar public service facilities serving residential 
areas. 
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Public or Private schools, churches and church schools, provided such uses do not include residence 




Single-family dwellings. Single-family dwelling, may include the rooming and/or boarding of up to two (2) 
persons, provided no separate kitchen is involved. (Including double-wide mobile homes.) 
Townhouses. 
1. Animal Keeping: Limitations on the keeping and maintenance of animals and fowl permitted in the 
R zone. 
a. At any time the keeping of animals becomes a nuisance, as to be determined by the Town 
Council, the Town shall have the authority to force the violator to remedy the nuisance situation 
within thirty (30) days of official notification.. 
b. Upon failure to remedy a nuisance situation, after proper notification, the Town shall have the 
authority to force the violator to cease such operations. 
c. Nothing herein shall be construed as authorizing the keeping of animals capable of inflicting 
harm or endangering the health and safety of any person or property. 
2. Limitations on double wide mobile homes permitted in the R zone: 
a. Axles must be removed. 
b. Mobile homes must be completely skirted with materials approved by the Commission. 
3. Limitations of the development of Multiple-family dwellings permitted in the R zone. 
a. Multiple-family dwellings to a maximum of two (2) units per structure may be placed on a single 
XA acre lot. 
b. Maximum density created by development of duplex structure (s) shall be four (4) duplex units 
per acre. 
c. Permitted Accessory Uses. Accessory uses and structures are permitted in the R zone, provided 
they are incidental to, and do not substantially alter the character of the permitted principal use or 
structure. Such permitted accessory uses and structures include, but are not limited to, the 
following: 
1. Accessory buildings such as garages, carports, bath houses, greenhouses, gardening sheds, 
recreation rooms, and similar structures which are customarily used in conjunction with 
and incidental to a principal use or structure. 
2- Swimmino tv\n1c 
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3. Storage of materials used for the construction of a building, including a temporary 
contractor's office and/or tool shed, provided that such uses are on the building site or 
immediately adjacent thereto, and provided further that such shall be for only the period 
of construction and thirty (30) days thereafter. 
4. Storage of potentially useable materials for personal use may be kept; if storage of said 
material does not pose a safety or fire hazard. Also storage must be kept in an orderly and 
organized manner as far from public view as possible. 
5. Buildings or structures required for the housing, nurture, confinement or storage of animals 
permitted in this zone, or equipment required for the care and keeping thereof. 
6. Home occupations, subject to the conditions of Chapter 14 of This Title, 
B. Conditional Uses. Uses and structures are permitted in the R zone only after a Conditional Use Permit 
has been obtained and subject to the terms and conditions thereof. 
10-4-3 LOT AREA 
The minimum area for any lot or parcel of land in the R zone shall be 1 /4 acre (10,890 square feet). 
> 10-4-4 LOT WIDTH 
Each lot or parcel of land in the R zone, except corner lots, shall have a width of not less than seventy-five 
(75 ) feet. Each comer lot or parcel in the R zone shall be ten (10) feet wider than the minimum required for 
interior lots. 
10-4-5 LOT FRONTAGE 
Each lot or parcel of land in the R zone shall abut a public street for a minimum distance of seventy-five 
(75) feet, or thirty-five (35) feet along the circumference of a cul-de-sac improved to Town standards-
Frontage on a street end which does not have a cul-de-sac improved to Town standards shall not be counted 
in meeting this requirement 
10-4-6 PRIOR CREATED LOTS 
Lots or parcels of land which were created prior to the application of the zone, shall not be denied a building 
permit solely for reason of non-conformance with the parcel requirements of this chapter. 
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10-4-7 LOT AREA PER DWELLING 
Not more than one single-family dwelling, or multiple-family structure(i.e.), a duplex, to a maximum of two 
(2) units may be placed on a lot area ( see 10-4--3). 
1<M_8 YARD REQUIREMENT 
The following minimum yard requirements shall apply in the R Zone. 
A. Front yard. Each lot or parcel in the R Zone shall have a front yard of not less than thirty (30) feet. 
B. Side yard. Except as provided in sub-section "CM, each lot or parcel of land in the R Zone shall have a 
side yard of not less than ten (10) feet, and the combined sum of the two side yards shall not be less than 
twenty (20) feet 
C. Side yard - Corner lots. On corner lots the side yard contigious to the street shall not be less than 
twenty-four (24) feet and shall not be used for vehicle parking except such portion as is devoted to 
driveway use for access to a garage or carport. 
D. Side yard - Driveway. When used for access to a garage, carport, or parking area, a side yard shall be 
wide enough to provide an unobstructed ten (10) foot driveway. 
E. Side yard - Accessory building. An accessory building may be located on the property line if, and only if, 
all of the following conditions are met: 
1. The accessory building is located more than six (6) feet to the rear of any main building on the 
same lot or the lot adjacent to the property line on which said building is being placed. 
2. It has no openings on the side which is contiguous to the property line of an adjacent lot 
3. It has one hour fire resistant construction in the wall adjacent to said property line. 
4. It provides for all roof drainage to be retained on the subject lot or parcel. 
An accessory building which does not meet the above conditions shall be at least five (5) feet from the side 
property line. 
F. Rear Yard. Each lot or parcel shall have a rear yard of no less than thirty (30) feet. 
G. Rear yard - accessory building. An accessory building may be located on the property line so long as: 
1. It has no openings on the side which is contiguous to the rear nrmwfv lin** 
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2. It has one hour fire resistant construction in the wall adjacent to said property line. 
3. It provides for all roof drainage to be retained on the subject lot or parcel. 
4. A double frontage or through lot shall have a front yard as required by the respective zone on 
each street on which it abuts. 
An accessory building which does not meet the above conditions shall be at least five (5) feet from the 
rear property line. 
10-4-9 PROJECTIONS INTO YARDS 
A. The following structures may be erected on or projected into any required yard. 
1. Fences and walls in conformance with Town codes or ordinances. 
2. Landscape elements, including trees, shrubs, agriculture crops and other plants. 
3. Necessaiy appurtenances for utility services. 
4. Front steps. 
B. The structures listed below may not project into a minimum front yard. 
1. Porches 
2. Fireplace structures and bays. 
3. Stairways, balconies, decks, fire escapes, and awnings. 
10-4-10 BUILDING HEIGHT 
No lot or parcel of kind in the R Zone shall have a building or structure used for dwelling or public assembly 
which exceeds a height of three (3) stories or thirty-five (35) feet, whichever is higher. Roofs 
above the square of the building, chimneys, flagpoles, church towers and similar structures not used for 
human occupancy are excluded in determining height. 
10-4-11 PARKING, LOADING AND ACCESS 
Each lot or parcel in the R Zone shall have on the same lot or parcel off street parking sufficient to comply 
with Chapter 13 of this title. Required parking spaces shall not be provided within a required front yard. 
10-4-12 SITE PLAN APPROVAL 
As required by the Uniform Building Code and the requirements of the Hinckley Town building permit. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10-4-13 OTHER REQUIREMENTS 
A. Signs. Refer to Chapter 15 Sign Ordinance. 
B. Landscaping. All open areas between the front lot line and the rear line of the main building, except 
driveways, parking areas, walkways, utility area, improved decks, patios, porches, etc., shall be maintained 
with suitable landscaping. 
C. Junk & Trash Storage. No trash, junk, or unusable materials shall be stored in an open area All such 
materials must be screened from public streets and adjacent properties, or must be stored within an enclosed 
building. Such materials must be stored in such a manner that it cannot be carried off the premises by natural 
forces, causes, or animals. Any such storage shall not present an objectionable odor or health hazard. 
Violators will be given twenty one (21) days to be in compliance. No Grandfather clause shall apply to this 
provision. 
D. Wrecked Vehicles. Wrecked vehicles cannot be parked on public streets for more than seventy two (72) 
hours. They may not be kept on private property more than thirty (30) days unless screened from public 
streets and adjacent properties, or stored within an enclosed building. No more that six (6) vehicles shall be 
allowed at anytime. Proper rodent and weed control must be adhered to for public safety. No Grandfather 
clause shall apply to this provision. 
E. In-operable/Non-salvageable Vehicles. Such vehicles cannot be parked on public streets. Only two (2) 
such vehicles may be stored within a minimum of one hundred (100) feet from the front property line. All 
other such vehicles must be screened from public streets and adjacent properties, or stored within an enclosed 
building. No more than six (6) vehicles shall be allowed at anytime. Proper rodent and weed control must be 
adhered to for public safety. Violators will be given thirty (30) days to be in compliance. No Grandfather 
clause will apply to this provision. 
F. In-operable Farm Implements. In-operable faim implements may be kept as long as they are in a neat and 
orderly fashion. Proper rodent and weed control must be adhered to for public safety. They may be kept, if 
being used as a landscaping or decorative item in the front yard. Violators will be given thirty (30) days to be 
incompliance. No Grandfather clause will apply to this provision. 
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G. Walls and Fences. 
Front Yard! Fence that does not obstruct the view (e.g. chain link fence) may be erected to a height 
of five (5) feet in any front yard abutting a street within the set back area. The fence shall in no way 
be closed in with adjacent plant material or strips of materials inserted into the fence so as to obstruct 
vision. Any portion of a composite fence above thirty six (36) inches shall not obstruct vision. 
Side Fences not abutting a street shall not exceed six (6) feet in height. This side fence shall not 
extend into the thirty (30) feet front yard set back. 
Side Fences in the front yard thirty (30) feet front set back shall not be over thirty six (36) inches in 
height These fences shall be made of materials that shall not obstruct vision (for example, chain link, 
field fence, spaced picket, ect.) 
4. Side and Rear Fences abutting a street shall not exceed six (6) feet in height. This side fence shall 
not extend into the thirty (30) foot front yard set back. 
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